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Guerilla Warfare
There are two ways to fight a war. One is mindless destruction. The other is intelligence
wedded to technology. We see the former in today's world represented by tyrants and terrorists who are fearsome
beasts but military incompetents. Author Neal Stephenson, in his book Cryptonomicon, has his lead character
say … "people like that can conquer and control large chunks of the world if they are not resisted…Who is
going to fight them off … who will prevent them from running the whole world? "
In the decline and denial of failed states of the West, the answer is the idea that nothing is worth fighting for.
Better to be the friend of tyrants so that they will attack you last. In the failed states of the Middle East,
the countervailing answer for some is that total destruction is better than continued existence. Into that witch's
brew of humiliation, envy and anti-Semitism, the Ba'athist remnant, imported assassins from surrounding states
and local hirelings in Iraq introduced an attempt at organized guerilla warfare this week. In case we have forgotten,
guerilla warfare has several distinct characteristics.
Stratfor.com's Morning Intelligence Briefing reminds us of the writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap. The commander
of North Vietnamese forces in both their war against the French and the United States, Giap is a distinctive authority
on insurgency. His principals apply to Sunni Iraq today. First, create superior intelligence. Second, secure the
loyalty of the people. Third, erode support for the war in the home country of your enemy by imposing unacceptable
costs.
Giap divides guerilla warfare into three stages.
Stage One. Small scale operations.
- Inflict casualties, court the local population. This stage is political and psychological and its goal is to
drive a wedge between the enemy and the local population by provoking the enemy into doing things that alienate
and harass the people in a manner that can be readily and quickly reported on television.
Stage Two. Integrated small and larger units.
- Increase the tempo by drawing the enemy into ambushes and establisihing areas where the enemy cannot maneuver.
Create the impression of opposition failure by attacking the enemy's isolated small forces with your intermediate
forces. Exhaust the enemy through superior intelligence, mobility and stealth. Force the enemy into asymmetric
battle that simultaneously drains his resources and creates extreme actions that generate hostility in the local
population.
Stage Three. Conventional forces.
- Large conventional forces are employed in battle against a demoralized enemy lacking support at home. Offer
a cease fire as a way out and a token to the world of peaceful and reasonable intentions.
The United States and its allies are involved in an unanticipated guerilla war that currently stretches from
Baghdad proper to the west and north and encompasses the Sunni areas of Iraq. As summarized by Stratfor's Dr. George
Freidman, the insurgency represents substantial, but not insurmountable, risks to the allied forces.
1. Saddam's neglect of infrastructure and the destruction caused by organized "looting" deprives the
United States of the ability to quickly and dramatically improve ordinary living conditions. In turn, that creates
an opening to exploit dissatisfaction with the occupation by local political parties. These are classic guerilla
conditions, especially for the Sunni Ba'athists who will lose power and prestige in a free Iraq anyway.
2. The current success of daily operations scattered over wide terrain indicates a decent command and control system
with a functioning intelligence network. There appears to be adequate weapons and reserve supply caches including
cash money. It is likely that such caches were pre-positioned. And thus the insurgency is a planned activity. The
attacks seem to be both well-organized and executed in a sophisticated manner, in spite of the fact that few units
of the Iraqi army received this type of training. A daily report in the press of killing Americans undermines the
regional perception of U.S. power and implies to all that perhaps the American's have reached their limits.
3. The massive insertion of military force into a civilian community creates hostility as time passes. Suppressing
an insurgency without alienating the population is a very tricky business and an extreme challenge for troops that
are and look foreign, are untrained in the local language and are culturally incapable of making the subtle distinctions
that would identify guerillas as they mix with the general population.
The key for the United States is to catch the commanders and destroy the command and control system. The great
weakness of the guerilla side is that the terrain does not allow for concealed movement and is, in fact, wide open
to airpower attacks day and night. Thus, they can never assemble the forces needed to reach stage two. Unlike Viet
Nam, there is no current sanctuary or source of re-supply and rest.
A very positive sign for allied forces was the raid and capture this week of Abid Hamid Mahmoud al-Tikriti, Saddam's
most trusted aide. Such a raid might indicate that U.S. intelligence has improved enough to where it can capture
senior Iraqi officers and target elite Special Guard units. A successful counterinsurgency strategy requires cutting
off the guerillas from popular support and destroying supply sources before forces can be built up. If, in fact,
the allies can identify and neutralize insurgents without generating popular hostility and its accompanying press
coverage then the insurgency is doomed.
The last remaining question is the speed at which accurate intelligence accumulates. The faster the better. Other
pressing matters await.
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