The current childish and puerile political season consists of the Democrats campaigning
on being elected because they are not Republicans. The Republicans counter with "we are not Democrats."
Neither side has advanced fresh ideas. Polls show the Iraqi issue as paramount but for our politicans its stale
bread and rancid butter all around.
Journalist Sharon Behn, writing in the Washington Times, summarizes the leading proposals for a strategic course
correction in Iraq, possibly before the end of the year. The question will be - what is Plan B?
Propaganda media and polls aside, it is clear that the current strategic plan isn't working and sectarian violence
is accelerating. The Sunnis are fierce in their determination not to be ruled by Shia. They are getting their materiel
and money from the radical Saudi elements that support Wahabbi and al Qaeda aggression. Their leadership comes
from ex-Baathists who train foreign holy warriors ready to go home again once they are victorious. Iraq is the
center of their efforts to humble the United States and its Saudi money that is behind them.
The Iraqi Arab Shia, by contrast, are getting their support from the Iranian Persian Shia. There are identifiable
munitions factories in the northern Lavizan district of Tehran that supply the Mahdi Army. Yet they have never
been touched, not one single bomb has dropped on them. Neither has the principle Iranian agent in Iraq - Moqtada
Sadr - been restricted in any way. He receives millions in annual support from Iran.
Iraq is in a stalemate that cannot continue. The leading candidates for implementation as Plan B include the following.
Phased Withdrawal
U.S. troops would be gradually withdrawn (perhaps five percent every two months) and a quick reaction reserve force
would be redeployed elsewhere in the region. The primary objective would be to remove U.S. forces since they are
a catalyst for violence. The Iraqi forces would be pressured to take control by the withdrawal.
This plan, the work product of Richard Clarke and Rep. John Murtha, is opposed by most Iraqis on the grounds that
without a strong U.S. presence, the country would quickly fall into a civil war. (While it might be called a "civil
war," in all likelihood it would be a surrogate war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.) Terrorists would easily
establish safe havens from which they could attack and harass any neighboring country with the temerity to allow
non-Muslims bases on their soil.
Partition
Advanced by Sen. Joe Biden, this plan conceives of a "Swiss Canton" procedure. The Kurdish, Sunni and
Shia areas would be given a great deal of autonomy. A central government would be responsible for border defense,
foreign policy, oil production and distribution of oil revenues. The Alaskan oil royalty trust concept for all
citizens is feasible under this plan.
A weak central government is not the answer to murderous militias affiliated with warlords and political parties,
critics say. This solution would find immediate support among the Kurds who have worked for years under policies
that gave them considerable autonomy. They have little interest beyond self protection in what happens in Baghdad.
Dividing up the population is an academic, not a practical solution. In the major population centers, ethnic and
religious groupings are thoroughly intermingled.
Many Shi'ites would welcome a partition arrangement. That is because they control the southern oil fields. They
have already passed a local law encouraging the establishment of autonomy.
The rubber hits the road in Sunni territory. The Sunni have fierce willpower but no oil or much else in the way
of resources. Sen. Biden proposes a twenty percent revenue guarantee as an incentive to cooperate. Others have
suggested financing and development of a petro-chemical industry to provide jobs in the region.
Getting down to Arab practicalities, the Kurds face a greedy neighbor in Turkey to the north who covets their oil
fields. An autonomous Shia region could quickly become an Iranian satellite with a long and unprotected Saudi border.
The Sunni region would likely prove ungovernable, offering a safe haven to al Qaeda and its allies as they prepare
for attacks on Jordan and Saudi Arabia. A civil war would be many-sided. Loyalties to clan and family exceed any
regard for the Iraqi nation. Within each ethnic division there would be sub-groups with their own militias.
A Strong Man Coup
A favorite of Arab street gossip is the return of a strong man. Under this scenario, the U.S. trained Iraqi Army
in alliance with remaining Baathist elements would stage a coup. They would boot out the weak horse - the al-Maliki
government - and install the strong horse - the ex-Baathist, secular Shi'ite Iyad Alawi.
The U. S. would divert its gaze for awhile, wring its hands a bit and come around to "reality" after
a decent interval.
While this smacks of a Kissinger realist solution, a strong man such as Alawi who enjoys the support of both secular
Shia and Sunnis sick of violence, would not be bad for the United States. From the American point of view, policy
issues in the Middle East do not require a democracy. All that is required is a stable and friendly Iraq, plus
a deaf ear at home to the cries of dealing with dictators.
The Sunnis would be mollified by bringing back portions of Saddam's army to protect them from Shia militias. Most
national elements would support Iraq as one country instead of three weak parts if it had a strong leader. A strong
man would also be favorably received in the neighborhood. The downside to depending on a strong man strategy is
the favorite Arab solution to conflict - assassination.
The question for Iraq is who will get the 2006 vote?
Most of the Congressional races are still too close to call today. Either candidate's election is still within
the margin of error Will MSM voter suppression tactics defeat get out the vote drives? We shall soon see.
It's troops on the ground versus propaganda in the air.
October 20, 2006
