In a holiday news week, the working press is grateful for any electricity. Revved
up reporting depends on motion, emotion and commotion. It is required in today's media world in order to escape
the clutter and be noticed in the 24/7 news.
To the cynical, some retired Clinton-era generals took advantage of the slow news week to boost their '08 political
prospects, their current book sales and their upcoming speech bookings. Their ill-considered campaign to get Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld fired was summarized by President Bush this way - "I am the decider." Under the American
system, elected officials name and confirm civilian heads of government. The military does not get to pick its
own bosses.
The six old-guard leaders all had distinguished military careers and are proven warriors. Their political judgments,
not their patriotism, are what critics are calling into question. It is harsh but fair to say that they are career
officers who were passed over and then retired.
At a time when the nation faces four significant foreign policy issues - China, Iran, Iraq and Israel - and four
overwhelming domestic issues - illegal immigration, trade deficits, health care and energy - the generals decided
that now was time to air their personal grievances.
With the erstwhile Wesley Clarke bringing up the rear, the revolting generals are:
- General Anthony Zinni (USMC)
Major General John Batiste (USA)
Major General John Riggs (USA)
Major General Charles Swannack (USA)
Major General Paul Eaton (USA)
Lt. General Gregory Newbold (USMC)
The generals specific public charges were lightweight, unsubstantial, vague and confusing. Since in the end
they called for the Secretary's resignation, the six received lots of hyperventilating press coverage. Nothing
was made of the issues they raised, however. Much of the MSM, as has now come to be expected, could not find a
way to present both sides.
The various individual general's complaints could be summarized as (1) Rumsfield wasn't nice and he coldly rejected
ideas he didn't agree with, (2) Mistakes were made in Iraq, and (3) Reorganizing the military is wrong - massive
power is more important than speed, even in a high-tech era.
Coming of age in the Vietnam era and beholden to the Clinton administration for their advancement, the six speak
for the Old Guard opposed to Pentagon reorganization, They are the crowd that advocates a million-man-Army with
lots of heavy tanks and giant artillery stationed in Europe. They have been adamantly and consistently opposed
to the 500,000-man rapid reaction strike force concepts of the pentagon reformers. A primary goal of theirs in
replacing Rumsfeld would be to get a new SECDEF who would reverse or at least modify the rapid reaction reform
agenda.
While the six are not a formal group, it is said that they do talk regularly to each other. With the exception
of Zinni and the uninvited Clarke, the group had previously been thought to be politically astute.
They can broadly be described as "Colin Powell supporters" with ties to the status quo wing of the State
Department. They tend to follow Scowcroftian "realist" precepts. They support containment and engagement
policies such as the 12-year old No Fly zones and Oil-for-Food sanction programs. Their military philosophy is
to build a huge force and then don't use it. In their world, no general ever has enough troops. It was on their
watch that human intelligence faded away.
How have the six plus one fared in their quest?
Rumsfeld Is Intimidating. The administration countered the TV and Op-Ed appearances of the six with retired
generals of its own. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Richard Myers, Central Command's Gen. Tommy Franks and Frank's
deputy at CINC Lt. Gen. Mike DeLong made an extensive case that there had been appropriate give and take in planning
Iraq.
The issue, Rumsfeld's defenders pointed out, was that once a decision is made in private, the officers should support
it in public (the Gen. Shinseki dilemma). Undermining civilian control of the military in time of war encourages
the enemy and discourages the alliance. Creating doubt over whether America will again abandon its friends undermines
the war effort of the nation. The dissenting general's public actions energize America's enemies and encourage
them to fight on. They discourage America's allies and increase their fear of abandonment. In the language of terrorist
strategy, the general's actions help to create chaos.
The press coverage of the "too arrogant" charge, reminds us of the Beltway definition of "arrogance."
In DC speak; you are "arrogant" when you don't follow my advice even after I specifically told you where
you were wrong. From the DC attitude comes the incredibly dubious idea currently circulating that if President
Bush would just get a SECDEF who spouted liberal ideas, the Democrats and the press would like him and his poll
numbers would rise.
The very opposite seems to be true. After Secretary's Perry, Cohen and Aspen, the idea that we have a civilian
who can intimidate generals is not an altogether unpleasant notion in the body politic.
Mistakes Were Made. The advocates of massive tank and artillery equipment and tactics say little about the
forces stuck in Turkey at the beginning of the war and what they had to do to get to the battlefront. The basing,
supply and transport requirements of a heavy army added to the bottlenecks created when Kuwait was full and Turkey
was empty.
The retired generals say nothing at all about the political analysis needed. A large majority of the mistakes made
in Iraq were political, not military. A larger force, for example, costs more, takes longer to move about and will
be perceived globally as an occupier. .Needless to say, more casualties, greater supply problems and gaps in the
inter-connected support systems will occur. "More troops" is at the least a concept needing two-sided
debate.
The force size topic was debated and a decision made. The call for more troops now is a cheap shot. The type of
troops with police training was not readily available and no one identified what bases should be reduced globally
to get the additional forces. The numbers involved could have reached 1.5 million. A draft would be necessary.
Unqualified troops with high-tech equipment are not a better answer.
Complaining that Rumsfeld didn't listen to them is a canard. The complaining generals were not so far up the ladder
as to report to the Secretary. They reported to other generals. Gen. Zinni, in fact, retired before Bush came to
office.
Future Forces. If America has invested so much in high-tech weapons that we rarely miss, why do we need
so many people? The truth is that in asymmetrical warfare, we may not need more people but we may well need different
training. The question yet to be answered is that after we swarm and win with our strike forces, what do we do
next?
As Iraq shows, Shock and Awe may work but the war could, as in Vietnam, still be lost. Fully half of the battle
is in the domain of public diplomacy and press relations. That's an area where all our government is impressively
weak.
The political problem in DC is that no one on either side has any sound idea of whether the Iraqi war will be won
or lost. No one wants to be on the wrong side. No one thinks they will know for sure by November. The idea of being
caught undermining a victor less he win again brings on the tremors in all limbs.
Currying favor with the Democrats may or may not pay off personally for the generals. Win or lose, the damned artillery
is still too big and heavy for the transport planes.
But one thing is sure. If Rumsfeld can be shaken loose, the Bush presidency is over.
04/21/06
